On cultural property and its protection: a law-and-economics comment by Mackaay, Ejan
On cultural property and its protection  
- a law-and-economics comment 
 
Forthcoming in: Die Konstituierung von Cultural Property. Forschungsperspektiven, Regina Bendix, Kilian 
Bizer et Stefan Groth (eds), Göttingen, Universitätsverlag, 2010 
 
Ejan Mackaay 
Emeritus Professor of Law, Université de Montréal 
Visiting Scholar, Cultural Property Research Group,  
Georg-August-Universität Göttingen 
ejan.mackaay@umontreal.ca 
 
 
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................. 1 
WHAT IS CULTURAL PROPERTY ................................................................................................. 3 
WHAT IS SPECIAL ABOUT CULTURAL PROPERTY ................................................................... 4 
WHO DECIDES WHAT TO DESIGNATE AS CULTURAL PROPERTY ......................................... 5 
HOW TO PROTECT CULTURAL PROPERTY ................................................................................ 7 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................... 10 
 
Introduction 
The term cultural property seems to have come into vogue after the Second 
World War as part of efforts to prevent the recurrence of the massive war-time 
destruction of objects of cultural significance to various groups and, in some 
cases, to all of humanity. The 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural 
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict1 symbolises those efforts. 
Destruction is not the only doomsday scenario for cultural property. Removal 
of objects from their owners or region of origin is another concern. This, too, had 
occurred during the Second World War with the nazis’ looting treasures of all 
kinds from occupied territories, not to mention the massive confiscation of the 
property of their Jewish victims everywhere. But the concern was older, as 
Merryman for one shows in the story of the Elgin marbles, brought from Greece 
                                            
1  The Hague, 14 May 1954, [on line: http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=13637&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html . The entire collection of 
UNESCO treaties on line is listed at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=12025&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=-471.html  
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to England during the 19th century.2 This concern has found expression in a 1970 
UNESCO treaty3 and in a 1995 Unidroit Convention4 seeking to halt international 
traffic in cultural property. 
These concerns have been extended to prevent culturally significant objects 
or intangibles from falling into ruins, oblivion or insignificance by neglect or by 
commercial exploitation. Further objects of concern are traditional knowledge 
held by tribes and, within their environment, plants with medicinal or 
pharmaceutical significance for industries in the developed world; the concern 
here is not merely their possible disappearance but also their exploitation without 
due, in particular financial, recognition for current holders of that knowledge. The 
concern to protect traditional knowledge finds expression inter alia in the 2003 
Paris Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage5 and in 
the 2005 Paris Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of 
Cultural Expressions6. 
From here it is but one step to the question of the extinction of animal and 
plant species and the disappearance of rain forests as a result of encroachment 
by those seeking economic development. This concern – to maintain biodiversity 
– is generally considered to lie outside the perimeter of cultural property 
protection.7 
                                            
2  Merryman, John Henry, “Thinking about the Elgin Marbles”, (1985) 83 Michigan Law Review 
1881-1923. 
3  Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer 
of Ownership of Cultural Property, Paris, 14 November 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231, 9 I.L.M. 289 
(entered into force 24 April 1972) [UNESCO Cultural Property Convention] [on line: 
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=13039&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html ] 
4  UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects (Rome, 24 June 
1995) [on line:  
http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/1995culturalproperty/1995culturalproperty-e.htm] 
5  Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage 2003 (Paris, 17 October 
2003) 
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=17716&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html . 
6  Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (Paris, 
20 October 2005); on line: 
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=31038&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html . 
7  For an overview of that subject, see Biller, Dan, The economics of biodiversity loss, in: 
Solutions for the World's Biggest Problems: Costs and Benefits, Bjørn Lomborg (ed.), 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 162-177.  
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What is cultural property 
This brief overview of treaties dealing with the protection of one or other form 
of cultural property makes obvious that the term is used to cover a wide variety 
of matters. What precisely should be included amongst the objects we seek to 
preserve because of their cultural significance, collectively designated as 
“cultural property” or “(cultural) heritage”? Surely not everything belonging to the 
lifestyles of earlier times would qualify, as that would simply stifle development. 
Cultural property appears to be reserved for objects, tangible as well as 
intangible, that are significant expressions of the culture or collective identity of 
humanity as a whole or of specific groups and that are considered to be 
particularly worthy of preservation because of artistic, archaeological, 
ethnological or historical interest.8 Examples would be collections of fauna, flora, 
minerals or anatomy; historical buildings or landscapes, religious or other; 
antiquities; significant art of all kinds; traditional knowledge; folklore, customs 
and rites.9 The French language used in Quebec might be seen here as cultural 
property to be preserved. 
Cultural property need not necessarily take traditional forms, although much 
that is currently recognised as such does. In his interesting paper elsewhere in 
this volume, Johannes Müske stresses that new technologies can be used to 
capture the expressions of cultural property, such as sounds and tones, or the 
funeral rituals on Bali. But that is not the end of the story, since if culture is taken 
as “the whole way of life”, much of current culture is expressed in ways 
conditioned by newly available technologies and hence evolving at the pace at 
which these technologies appear. This is obvious for communications 
technologies, from the telephone, through television, to mobile phones, Skype 
and web 2.0, as much as for transportation technologies which give us a mobility 
inconceivable until now, as well as the identity, social and artistic practices that 
come with them. So technology does not necessarily erase culture, but may also 
give expression to new forms of it. Science, for one, will never be the same since 
the internet. Art may not be either, if it is separated from the physical supports 
with which it had become associated in the older culture. What of all this wealth 
                                            
8  Merryman, John Henry, « Two Ways of Thinking about Cultural Property », (1986) 80 
American Journal of International Law 831-853. 
9  See, Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and 
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property 1970, art. 1; http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=13039&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html .  
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of new cultural expression is significant and how it should be preserved and 
made accessible in digital form are unresolved questions lying ahead of us and 
requiring our attention. Authenticity may take on an altogether different meaning 
in this context.10 
What is special about cultural property 
The use of the term “cultural property” suggests that there is something 
special about the class of phenomena so designated that requires our attention 
and perhaps specific measures for their protection or preservation. Special 
protection should not be granted lightly, since elites and other special interest 
groups in society have been known to clamour for special protection as a cover 
for preserving their privileges; the effect of such protection has invariably been to 
slow down innovation to the detriment of society at large and of the less well-off 
in particular.  
The argument that special measures are necessary because the 
commodities or services are essential to our well-being is not in itself convincing 
either. Many essential commodities and services are available through ordinary 
market processes with the associated property rights and other legal 
infrastructure, without most of us giving it a second thought. This is obvious for 
food and other current consumption objects. Closer to cultural property, the 
preservation of antiques seems to work well enough through private markets. For 
individually produced or very rare artefacts like paintings, public initiative such as 
museums may have to complement market processes. 
So what is special about cultural property? In their paper elsewhere in this 
volume, Biksei, Bizer and Gubaydulina point to its being associated with 
personal identity and dignity of members of a group. In a recent book Akerlof and 
Kranton argue that identity makes a useful addition to the economist’s toolkit, as 
it explains how persons assume roles, accept norms and make decisions.11 Their 
view is that it allows one to account for some decisions that in the traditional full 
rationality model used by economists would appear anomalous, such as why 
immigrant children adopt the accent of their peers rather that of their parents or 
                                            
10  Bendix, Regina, in Search of Authenticity - The Formation of folklore Studies, Madison, WI, 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1997. 
11  Akerlof, George A. and Rachel E. Kranton, Identity Economics: How Our Identities Shape 
Our Work, Wages, and Well-Being, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2010. 
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how Codes of honour operate effectively in military and other circles.12 In their 
contribution to the volume, Hauser-Schäublin and Klenke explicitly link identity 
and cultural heritage. For our purposes, the argument would be that imperilling 
cultural property that supports persons’ identity or dignity would dissolve (some 
of) the cement of society.  
Why can the provision of this kind of cultural property not be left to ordinary 
market processes? Economists would look for an answer in the public good 
characteristics of the phenomenon in question. It is perhaps helpful to look for 
inspiration at a recent contribution to that literature dealing with biodiversity.13 
The central reasons for biodiversity requiring our attention consist mainly of three 
factors:  
- a potential large “scale” effect;  
- irreversibility; 
- uncertainty, to which one might add that  
- few ecosystems are undisturbed by human activity.  
It is worth pondering to what extent these factors are transposable to the 
cultural diversity context; “human activity’ might be taken here as the corrosive 
effect of contact with cultures based on a developed economy, mass production 
and standardised language. Irreversibility and uncertainty appear to be present 
for some forms of cultural property ads well. Is protection of cultural property 
somewhat like erosion control in ecosystems? That would raise a collective 
action problem: the result will only come about with everyone or nearly everyone 
contributing. The temptation to free ride may be too strong for some and the 
enterprise may come to naught unless public authority steps in.  
Who decides what to designate as cultural property  
Since not all cultural expression is at once significant and in (apparent) need 
of protection, the question arises of who should decide what qualifies. In open 
economies, one would be tempted to reach for the background rule, which is to 
leave that decision with the owner of the object or the persons directly affected. 
The drawback of the first solution is obvious in the title of a book by Sax: should 
                                            
12  Akerlof 2010, at 11. 
13  Biller, Dan, The economics of biodiversity loss, in: Solutions for the World's Biggest 
Problems: Costs and Benefits Bjørn Lomborg (ed.), Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2010, pp. 162-177, at 174. 
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one let Rembrandts be used as dartboards or ritually burnt during a funeral 
ceremony for a very wealthy deceased?14 If the decision is left to a group, one 
faces the question of who controls the decision-making procedure within it. How 
are conflicting views reconciled or conflicts resolved (for instance as regards the 
filming of traditional funeral rites by western film makers, as highlighted in 
Engelbrecht’s contribution elsewhere in this volume)? The preferences of the 
chief or of an elite might be imposed on the rest of the group, usually to the 
detriment of innovation by the unorthodox. When the decision is left with the 
authorities at the level of the nation state, how is one to ensure that what matters 
for persons’ identity at the local level gets its due in a playing field comprising 
many millions of persons? In their conclusion, Hauser-Schäublin and Klenke 
express misgivings about how well local interests are going to be represented in 
the negotiations amongst nations states at the UNESCO level. The risk of 
infighting amongst interest groups is obvious. 
The relevance of these considerations comes out when one considers what 
happens in the case of a mistaken decision. A decision to protect something as 
cultural property comes with restrictions on what can be done with it or to it. On 
experience, the locals may learn that the costs outweigh the benefits. Who 
should have a say in the decision to reverse the decision? Perhaps here too one 
should consider the principle of subsidiarity: leave the decision at the lowest 
possible level at which the interests of all persons affected will weigh in in the 
decision. Peselmann and Socha elsewhere in this volume examine the problem 
and how it was resolved in the case of the Elbe Valley. 
The subsidiarity principle would be of little guidance where the object in 
question is designated as part of the common heritage of all of mankind. 
Merryman, in a path-breaking paper in 1982,15 appears to have in mind this kind 
of object in highlighting the “internationalist” view of cultural property: look at 
cultural property as “components of a common human culture, whatever their 
places of origin or present location, independent of property rights or national 
jurisdiction.”16 He adds: “Another way of thinking about cultural property is as 
part of a national cultural heritage. This gives nations a special interest, implies 
the attribution of national character to objects, independently of their location or 
                                            
14  Sax, Joseph L, Playing Darts with a Rembrandt: Public and Private Rights in Cultural 
Treasures, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1999. 
15  Merryman, John Henry, “Two Ways of Thinking about Cultural Property”, (1986) 80 
American Journal of International Law 831-853. 
16  Merryman 1982, at 831. 
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ownership, and legitimizes national export controls and demands for the 
"repatriation" of cultural property. As a corollary of this way of thinking, the world 
divides itself into source nations and market nations.”17  
It appears, however, that the opposite or “nationalist” view of cultural 
property has carried the day: what is cultural property is decided by or within 
nation states. Where cultural property is considered of significance for all of 
humanity, even national authorities would have their hands tied. Yet how this 
works out in practice will very much depend on the priorities of those who 
provide the funds for preservation.  
How to protect cultural property 
Considering the extraordinary variety of phenomena designated as “cultural 
property”, it is hardly surprising to find a bewildering variety of institutions used or 
advocated for their preservation: regulation of use, trade, import and export; 
certification and licensing; intellectual property rights; subsidies or tax 
advantages; nationalisation. Most of these reflect the view that ordinary market 
processes with the associated property rights and legal infrastructure won’t do 
the job because of the public good character of cultural property objects or 
significant negative externalities associated with their loss.  
The large scale of the loss of cultural property, its sometimes unique 
character and the irreversibility of its loss would seem to militate for extraordinary 
measures of preservation. Yet the level of precautions against accidents is never 
boundless; it should be adjusted to, but limited by, the loss they are designed to 
prevent – a principle known in law-and-economics as the Hand test.18 Given the 
uncertainty regarding the speed at which loss of cultural property will occur and 
the evaluation of the resulting loss, it may be difficult to determine the 
appropriate level of precaution with precision. Some will be tempted to err of the 
side of caution and invoke the – rather indeterminate – precautionary principle.19  
Beyond these general considerations, can we develop some general 
guidelines? A good place to start may be Biller’s policy recommendations in the 
                                            
17  Merryman 1986, 832. 
18  Mackaay, Ejan and Stéphane Rousseau, Analyse économique du droit, Paris/Montréal, 
Dalloz-Sirey/Éditions Thémis, 2008, (2nd ed.), no 188, at 335; Wikipedia United States v. 
Carroll Towing Co. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._Carroll_Towing_Co . 
19  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Precautionary_principle . 
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paper on biodiversity:  
- Eliminate perverse incentives 
- Privatise protection where feasible and involve local communities 
- Combine non-excludable attributes with excludable ones and take 
advantage of markets where these can deliver such tied goods 
- Ensure the provision of cultural property related public goods.20 
Perverse incentives are present when some persons can make money from 
activities that create losses to others (externalities) on can draw public money for 
activities without perceptible benefit to the public at large (rent-seeking). One 
may tempted to think that trade in cultural objects, removing them from their 
region of origin, would qualify as an externality and that the appropriate answer 
would be to prohibit it. But this would increase the value of such objects, create a 
black market and draw in shady operators who can handle the risk of operating 
in such a market.21 Surprisingly, we have learnt in trying to halt the decline of the 
rhinoceros and elephant populations in Africa, that is it better to allow some trade 
of the protected objects but in controlled fashion and to provide for access to 
interested persons to see them locally, giving locals an interest in providing the 
access (recommendation 2). It is not obvious whether this argument affects the 
question of whether cultural artefacts removed from their region of origin should 
be returned there – the Elgin marbles question mentioned above. 
For intangible cultural property such as dance forms, discussed in Eggert’s 
paper elsewhere in the collection, the broad guidelines suggest that 
experimentation of new forms should not be stopped (encouraging local 
entrepreneurship), though official certification might be reserved for the authentic 
forms. Some of the revenue generated by the marketing of new forms might be 
recycled into funds for research on the classical forms and training of young 
performers. This would seem to be a more promising tack than prohibiting any 
but the authentic forms from being expressed, as Lankau discusses in his paper 
in this volume. 
Should one attempt to stop outsiders from drawing inspiration from these 
forms for developing further derivative art? This may look like a touchy subject, 
but consider Gauguin’s paintings or van Gogh drawing inspiration from 
                                            
20  Biller 2010, at 170-172 
21  Bator, Paul M., “An Essay on the International Trade in Art”, (1982) 34 Stanford Law Review 
275-384 
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Hiroshige,22 which we seem to find unobjectionable? Fencing off intellectual 
creations from imitators and followers is done in the intellectual property world 
through intellectual property rights. But all of these have built-in limitations to 
restrict their effect to what is presumed to be minimally necessary to encourage 
those who make such creations, as Zimbehl explains in his contribution to the 
volume. Beyond it, information circulates freely and much of the economic 
development as we know it is based on innovations building onto earlier 
innovations. So far as we now understand it, this is not a constraint arbitrarily 
invented by the developed world to protect its privileged position, but 
fundamental to lifting oneself out of poverty through the advancement and 
application of knowledge. Whether there are other but equally promising ways of 
lifting the poorest nations out of poverty is an open question. Experimentation 
with other forms has not, so far, convincingly come up with any and has turned 
out in many cases to be extremely painful in terms of suffering of ordinary 
humans who were (unwilling participants in the experiment.  
Granting rights to communities without a clear justification of their incentive 
effects on creation requires an entirely different logic, as Hilty has shown in a 
recent paper.23 Should such sui generis rights be granted as incentives to 
preserve traditional knowledge? To pursue the idea, those rights would have to 
be perpetual; there would be a problem of who decides on what to do with them: 
within the community holding the rights, there could be opposition between 
traditionalists seeking to keep knowledge local and innovators tempted to give 
access against payment or to become entrepreneurs exploiting the knowledge 
themselves. If the latter are allowed to pursue their preferred option, would the 
knowledge then – in due course – become part of the stock of accessible 
accumulated human knowledge? Moreover, effective exploitation of knowledge 
in the medicinal and pharmaceutical domains may require operation at a very 
substantial scale, given the size of the risks of harm to humans involved; this 
may act as an entry barrier, but how serious it is is unclear, considering the 
phenomenal growth of big pharma in India and Brazil. Furthermore, creating 
more rights carries the risk of an anti-commons, as Bizer and Spindler have 
stressed in their paper in this volume: for a project requiring the consent of 
                                            
22  Geller, Paul Edward, “Hiroshige vs. Van Gogh: Resolving the Dilemma of Copyright Scope 
in Remedying Infringement”, (1998) 46 Journal of the Copyright Society of the USA 39-70. 
23  Hilty, Reto M., Rationales for the Legal Protection of Intangible Goods and Cultural Heritage, 
Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition & Tax Law Research Paper 
Series No. 09-10, 2009, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1470602 . 
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various rights holders, having too many rights, each with an effective veto right, 
may effectively stifle development.24 In some cases, such as the tradecraft of 
goldsmiths’ being patented discussed in the Hauser-Schäublin and Klenke 
paper, the wiser course might be to leave this knowledge unpatentable, in the 
public domain, forcing people to make their money on the artefacts they can 
produce with it. 
A brief observation should be added on the role of the UNESCO recognition 
of world heritage status to particular objects or monuments. It illustrates the 
difficulty highlighted above of who has a voice in the decision to recognise 
something as cultural property. The recognition itself acts economically like a – 
rather exclusive – standard or a collective trade-mark somewhat along the lines 
of geographical indications.25 A trade-mark conveys to consumers information 
that would otherwise be much costlier or even impossible to glean, simplifying 
and accelerating their decision as to whether to acquire or go and visit the object 
in question. The trade-mark itself does not stop anyone from offering similar 
ware but with a different label, perhaps quite successfully as French wine 
growers, insisting on their appellations controlees, discovered to their dismay in 
competition with wines from Australia, South Africa and Chile: consumers were 
not willing to pay premium price for those labels. So whilst there appears to be 
much “horse trading” around UNESCO recognition of world heritage status, the 
result is probably less distorting of ordinary market processes than one might 
fear. 
Conclusion 
Cultural property sounds like a powerful battle cry to spur people into action 
to protect common heritage. Terms matter, as Groth stresses in his paper in this 
collection. Stirring images can, however, be misleading. People may believe that 
extending copyright will protect poor authors, rather than the fat cats, or that a 
trade embargo is the best way of preserving cultural artefacts, whereas it is 
never fully effective and generally conjures up a black market with the attendant 
                                            
24  Heller, who first articulated the concept in a paper in 1988, summarises the literature in a 
recent book: Heller, Michael A., The Gridlock Economy: How Too Much Ownership Wrecks 
Markets, Stops Innovation, and Costs Lives, New York, Basic Books, 2008. 
25  A good summary of which may be found in Hughes, Justin, “Champagne, Feta, and 
Bourbon - The Spirited Debate About Geographical Indications”, (2007) 58 Hastings Law 
Journal 299-386. 
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corruption of officials who supervise the embargo. Good intentions are no excuse 
for bad results.  
In this brief comment, I have raised doubts as to the soundness of cultural 
property as an analytical concept. Many of the concerns that lie behind it appear 
to mirror the North-South or developing-developed nations debate. A good part 
of significant cultural property or world heritage is situated in developing 
countries, whereas the greatest concern to preserve it may be present in 
developed countries. One may be concerned that economic development lifting 
the poorest nations out of their poverty may be bought with a significant loss of 
cultural property, and want to do something about it. Market processes are not 
naturally protective of cultural property unless it is backed by willingness to pay.  
The difficulty is that the institutions that spring to mind to protect cultural 
property may have significant costs in terms of development and access to 
knowledge. The challenge is to understand the function of existing market and 
non-market institutions and to tailor adjustments to them so as achieve 
significant protection of cultural protection at acceptable cost. 
 
